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Abstract
As captured by neorealist theory, military power became increasingly relative
through into the twentieth century, leading to a concentration of power within and
between states—and enabling the buildup of huge colonial empires hardly a century
ago. Yet since 1945, due to the overproportional effectivity gained by weaker and in
particular nonstate actors it has become less relative, leading to a dispersion of
power—resulting in an often violent decolonization, the problems US and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization forces have faced in Iraq and Afghanistan in dealing with
comparatively small insurgencies and a growing number of failing states. Military
power has a selective function: the more relative it is, the more it restricts patterns
of conflict as well as the number and nature of actors relevant to international and
domestic security. Today, it is because military power is becoming less relative that
security policy has to adapt to increasingly asymmetric challenges.
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Instead of traditional military threats emanating from peer competitors among states,
since the end of the ColdWar the security strategies of nearly every larger power have
increasingly focused on new kinds of asymmetric threats: the growing peril of
terrorism, the dangers resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
the rising difficulties of regular force in prevailing in ‘‘low-intensity operations’’ or
‘‘new wars,’’1 and the related challenges of state failure. All these new threats have
one quality in common: the growing overproportional impact the use of force can
have, in particular, if deployed by weaker actors against stronger ones.
For centuries, the prevalent experience of Western powers with warfare emerged
from interstate conflicts among their equals while they enjoyed an asymmetric
superiority over different actors, as the process of colonial expansion showed well
into the twentieth century. Since 1945, however, in an increasing number of
conflicts, asymmetric differences now favored weaker and also technically less
advanced actors. That warfare is increasingly shaped by asymmetric forms of
conflicts has already been argued by many authors since the end of the Cold War.2
My own analysis tries to elaborate on one problem: Being a characteristic rather than
a cause, asymmetry requires rather than offers an explanation itself. If conflict
scenarios change, it is insufficient to analyze only the patterns of warfare or the
strategies followed by different actors. What has to be explained is why they change
in efficiency. In my view, the reason underlying this process can be best understood
as a transformation of military power (MP).
The growing relevance of asymmetric threats implies that MP becomes less
relative. It can be understood as being relative the more it depends on the propor-
tional distribution of material resources among actors: economic and demographic
potentials—with the available technologies creating advantages for more advanced
actors. The proportional possession of these resources defines which actors are
termed as strong or weak in this article. To assert that MP is becoming less relative
is a challenge in particular to structural neorealism. It contrasts, for instance, with a
formula John J. Mearsheimer has produced for measuring MP3 and generally with
Kenneth Waltz’s theorem that the relative distribution of capabilities determines the
power and accordingly the security of actors.4 Methodologically, however, my
analysis follows one proposition of neorealist theory: that MP has a selective effect.
It can be used in order to pursue all sorts of rationales. But as a means, it decides
which actors and rationales prevail or can affect the security of others.5
This selective effect has a far reaching impact on all theories concerning the inter-
national and domestic security of states. The more relative MP is, the more restrictive
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this selection becomes; for an actor then has to match an opponent’s strength to
become a potential threat; and the more it favors stronger actors and a concentration
of power both within and between states. The less relative MP becomes, the more
effective the use of force by weaker actors will be, hence favoring a dispersion of
power. Relativity implies similarities between the actors also with respect to strategy
and structure. If power is relative, relevant actors have to compete successfully for the
same kind of resources and consequently to adapt their behavior to a common standard
of efficiency. The less relative power becomes, not only more but also different kinds
of actors and models of rationality will gain relevance. Although the resulting loss of
calculability affects neorealist theory most directly, it also indirectly affects liberal or
constructivist approaches that focus on the function of actors as influenced either by
their internal structure or by their interaction.
Without disregarding other forms of power and in particular the significance of
‘‘soft power,’’6 my analysis is confined to the examination of MP. Even with regard
to an understanding of MP close to neorealist propositions, the literature on this
subject has largely been ‘‘built on weak foundations.’’7 And this is all the truer when
it comes to more asymmetric capabilities. In fact, there is not nor can there be a
general formula for MP. For as demonstrated later the same material resources can
constitute a different MP if used by different kinds of actors. But it is possible to
define the factors which constitute MP and explain how its quality can change.
MP is about capabilities, not strategy. As strategies determine the actual effective-
ness of warfare, MP determines its potential effectiveness. But this effectiveness
does not depend on abstract resources alone but also on how they can be used. What
MP is boils down to the tactical options it allows for and the strategies that can be
built upon them. My argument is that the strategic and tactical options of different
actors are determined by two kinds of factors that change over time: The evolution
of technology on one hand and social structures and values on the other hand.
Technology can but does not need to be a simple multiplier of MP favoring the
more advanced actor. Its evolution can also create options that favor the weak even
if they are less advanced. Social structures and values determine, first, the amount of
sacrifices a society is capable of bearing and to what extent it can actually mobilize
its human resources to create MP. They also determine, second, their capability to
use violence, and, third, the rules and ways in which a social organization can
actually deploy force. Each of these factors can be a multiplier or divisor of MP.
To demonstrate these propositions, I will in the first part of my article explore the
impact of technological progress, before proceeding to the second part to examine
the impact of social structures and values on the quality of MP.
The Evolution of Technology and the Transformation of MP
In this section, my argument falls into three parts. At first I want to point out how the
evolution of technology made power increasingly relative in modern times
(subsection The Increasing Relativity of MP in Modern History). In the second part,
334 Armed Forces & Society 40(2)
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on August 20, 2015afs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
it will be argued that the impact which the use of force can have is becoming
increasingly asymmetric today, thus making MP less relative. This will be
demonstrated by comparingmilitary options in a colonial war such as the British Sudan
campaign in the late nineteenth century with those in a twenty-first century insurgency
such as in Iraq after 2003 (subsection The Rise of Asymmetry in Recent Times). Third,
the resulting change in the effectiveness of MP for strong and weak, state and nonstate
actors will be analyzed (subsection The Ambivalence of MP Today).
The Increasing Relativity of MP in Modern History
MP became increasingly relative with the effective use of gunpowder. The
previously available weapons required far more skills, practice, and experience from
a warrior. That they ‘‘economized on training’’ was initially the reason why firearms
increasingly replaced other weapons on the battlefield.8 Manpower gained impor-
tance for MP and with it also the economic resources required to pay and equip
soldiers. The result was a massive growth of armies. Consequently, the feudal order
was increasingly replaced by the emerging modern state.9 To be sure, this growth
also followed the expansion of administrative capabilities.10 So, it is still the subject
of debate among historians whether the introduction of firearms triggered a military
revolution or was just part of a long-term evolution of military affairs, whether
technology was a driving force or whether ‘‘military change arose from the
absolutist state rather than causing it.’’11
Gunpowder also altered the balance between the defense and the offense. Before,
fortifications offered a comparatively cheap and effective way of enhancing the
ability of the weak to resist the strong. In the Dark Ages, the walls of each city or
castle could limit the power of rulers. But the development of increasingly effective
artillery rendered nearly all these walls obsolete. Although soon new fortresses were
invented, which offered no less protection, they became so costly that the number of
actors capable of fighting wars was to be reduced greatly to include only the larger of
the newly formed territorial states.12 Within their countries, rulers could now
increasingly subdue all other feudal powers, establishing the monopoly on the use
of force characteristic for the modern state.
As a result, warfare became the prerogative of the state adopting a trinitarian
structure, as it was now being waged by governments with regular armies that were
clearly distinguishable from the civilian population.13 As power was concentrated
within states so it began to be concentrated between them. Until the World Wars,
the evolution of firearms allowed relative firepower to increasingly become the most
decisive factor in war. The growth of armies triggered by the French and fostered by
the agrarian and the industrial revolutions prompted states to increasingly exploit
their demographic and industrial resources to generate MP.
In particular, military developments that increased the superiority of the offense
over the defense supported a concentration of power.14 As the proponents of the
offense–defense theory have pointed out, the evolution of technology repeatedly
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favored either defensive or offensive strategies thus decreasing or increasing the
security dilemma of actors.15 However, these were rather gradual differences that
occasionally sped up or slowed down the process; for until into the twentieth
century, the advantages or disadvantages that the offense or defense would offer
remained embedded in an overriding trend that allowed MP to become increasingly
relative by reinforcing the might of the stronger over the weaker.
One consequence was the global dominance established by Western powers until
1945. Another was that the number of relevant actors in terms of MP continued to
decrease, so that before the World Wars only a handful of great powers still possessed
the capability to wage wars against each other. This process reached its climax in
1945, when the five powers that became the permanent members of the security
council of the United Nation ruled virtually the whole world with their possessions,
dominions, and zones of influence. During the Cold War, a dualist power structure
even seemed to emerge, but in fact a process of refragmentation had begun that
resulted in an increase both in the number of states and the relevance of violent actors
within states. This development proceeded from the partisans of the World War II and
the Chinese Civil War, through the wars of decolonization to the insurgencies in Iraq
and Afghanistan and a growing number of states failing because of armed conflicts.
The Rise of Asymmetry in Recent Times
What is asymmetry in warfare? The term has been criticized for being of little
analytical value if meaning just an inequality of means or approaches directed against
the weak points of an enemy.16 In this sense, asymmetry would be nothing more than
the ‘‘essence of the practice of war.’’17 To be a useful concept, it has to embrace two
additional characteristics. First, in a conflict one side must be able to use means or tac-
tics which the other side does not possess or cannot employ themselves. Second, their
use must result in a greatly disproportionate impact.18 In a symmetric conflict, the
stronger side for employing more resources and consequently suffering more from
friction can generally be expected to bear the greater costs. But in the actual fighting,
the weaker side would ideally sustain losses in a reciprocally disproportionate manner
for being exposed to the enemy’s superior firepower. The measure for the effective-
ness of an asymmetric strategy is therefore the extent to which it can alter this ratio.
The potential influence of technologies on the efficiency of strategies can be
demonstrated with a simple thought experiment. Let us presume a conflict scenario
in which fifty fighters on one side are standing against five on the other, all of them
armed with muskets. Due to the limited accuracy, range, and shot frequency of the
musket the smaller group can perhaps hit two or three of their opponents in an
ambush but hardly avoid a counterattack that would probably wipe them out
completely. In such a case, the MP of both sides would be quite relative. However,
if all fighters were armed with automatic weapons and modern explosives, the
smaller group—using guerilla tactics—can keep a greater distance, avoiding identi-
fication and effective counterattack and inflicting much higher casualties on their
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enemies, perhaps even destroying them completely if they landed the first shot. In
this case, the relative firepower would remain exactly the same but the conflict
scenario could become much more asymmetric.
Ivan Arreguin-Toft has shown that the number of asymmetric conflicts in which the
weaker side won increased since 1945.19 His explanation focuses on the interaction of
different strategies: asWestern militaries were adapted during the ColdWar to the sce-
nario of a conventional war in Europe they faced difficulties engaging an enemy that
fought in a different manner.20 I would not deny the significance of that point, but I
will argue that it is only part of the problem. My argument is that it is not so much
the interaction between strategies that has changed but their respective effectiveness.
How the evolution of technology has influenced the evolution of MP can be
demonstrated by comparing the recent Iraq insurgency with a colonial war such
as the British Sudan campaign of 1898–99. In both cases, Western forces which were
adapted to conventional interstate warfare faced insurgencies that were driven—at
least for the most part—by similar fundamentalist ideologies. The Sudanese fighters
had also been no less ruthless or willing to make sacrifices than those in Iraq. In both
cases, the Western forces were much more advanced technologically than their
opponents, the Americans in Iraq even more so than the British in Sudan.
All the more striking are the differences with respect to manpower, outcome, and
the pattern of conflict. At first, just a look at the numbers of employed forces reveals
very different pictures of what MP could achieve in both cases. While the insurgents
in Iraq seem to have comprised barely more than a few 10,000 actual fighters at any
one time,21 the Mahdi army in Sudan mustered over 50,000 warriors at the battle at
Omdurman alone. Against them the British deployed 8,000 of their own and twice as
many Egyptian troops.22 In Iraq, the United States alone deployed up to 160,000 sol-
diers, with the Iraqi security forces providing a further few hundred thousand troops
over time.23 Thus, the ratio of manpower was at least thirty times more favorable for
the coalition in Iraq. But whereas the British were victorious in a comparatively
swift campaign, the coalition in Iraq failed to secure effective military control for
a much longer time. So, why were the British more successful in less time with a
much smaller force against a larger insurgency?
At first glance, the answer seems to be simple: the coalition in Iraq fought a kind of
guerilla war after the victory against Saddam’s regular army, while the war in Sudan
was decided in open battle. But to take these differences in strategy as an explanation
for the different efficiency of MP would be to confuse causes and consequences. For it
only leads to a more fundamental question, why did the insurgents in Sudan not
employ a similar strategy to the insurgents in Iraq? The most basic answer is, they
lacked the necessary tactical options. Technology limited these options with respect
to four factors: weapons, communications, transportation, and infrastructures.
First, most of the firearms the Mahdist army possessed were rather simple
weapons, with accuracy, range, and shot frequency that would have generated less
impact while exposing the fighters to a much greater risk even if they had attacked
the British in more asymmetric ways, as is the case with today’s insurgents in Iraq.
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Moreover, the insurgents lacked the explosives which in recent times in Iraq have
caused a large portion of the coalition’s casualties in the form of improvised
explosive devices. Second, today insurgents can use wireless communication to
detonate explosives from a safe distance and to exchange information. Modern
media carry news quickly all over the country, potentially mobilizing resistance and
enabling fighters to react to changing situations. Thus, no central organization is
needed to keep an insurgency going. But with wireless communication limited to the
range of sound or messengers and even with hardly any wired communications it is
difficult to imagine how the Mahdist army could have mobilized and coordinated its
forces in any other way than by concentrating them and consequently by facing the
enemy in an open battle.
Third, the available transportation limited the speed with which information and
also troops could travel, attack, and retreat. With the available transport in Sudan,
supply needed more central organization and required a concentration of forces, too.
But the more an opponent concentrates his forces and is dependent on centralized
structures, the easier it is to target and to destroy him. Today’s streets, cars, and even
public transport have greatly accelerated the insurgents’ potential movements and
enable them to target the enemy far outside their own territories. Fourth, the
evolution of infrastructures has made it much more difficult to control a territory
by MP. As in most parts of the world, most people in Sudan were not only cutoff
largely from anything but local information and lacking in the transport necessary
to participate in anything other than local conflict but also bound economically to
the land from which they lived. Many of the goods they needed or produced had
to be traded through a few economic centers. Because of the necessity to defend
them, the Mahdi army was forced to fight the British on the spot. Whoever
controlled these centers could control, tax, and administer the whole country.
Under these circumstances, it was comparatively easy to establish an effective mil-
itary control with comparatively small forces over comparatively long distances. To
rule it was not necessary to have an omnipresent force. Revolts could be isolated
locally and suppressed by sending in troops when required because the insurgents
could usually neither move away nor hide effectively. But today a much denser
network of infrastructures has greatly increased the mobility of people while reducing
their economic dependency on centralized structures. Thus, the difficulties of
establishing or maintaining military control of a territory have risen greatly. While
infrastructures a century ago generally supported the rule of stronger actors, they now
add to their vulnerability as their expansion increases the number of potential targets.
From this analysis, two conclusions can be drawn. First, because of the respective
development of weapons, communications, transportation, and infrastructures, it is
unlikely that the insurgents in Sudan would have been more successful if they had
followed the same strategy as the insurgents in Iraq. But also in late nineteenth cen-
tury Iraq, even an insurgency on a much larger scale would probably have been
defeated far more easily by a Western army, as Iraq was less remote, supplies would
have been easier to provide and the landscape would have posed fewer problems for
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troop movements or logistics while offering little protection for insurgents. When
the British actually were confronted with a large-scale insurgency in Iraq in 1920
they in fact needed more troops to subdue it than they did in Sudan because the Iraqi
rebels possessed far more modern firearms. But the British were still able to suppress
the revolt within a few months by mainly conventional military tactics.24
The second and more general conclusion is that in the past and in the present
asymmetric and in particular guerrilla wars have been effective largely for different
reasons. Before the World Wars, they proved to be effective—although hardly ever
successful in the end—in such distant theaters as the American Revolution, the
Spanish insurgency against Napoleon, the British–Afghan wars, the Boer war, and the
Rif war.25 But they did so only because they could take advantage of two factors:
terrain and logistics. In all cases the remoteness, profile, or size of the country impeded
the movements of regular troops and caused a high dependency on long lines of
supply, while the spread of settlements could even require a wide dispersal of troops.
It was these conditions that made superior forces vulnerable to guerrilla tactics.
Today, however, modern means of communication, transportation, and recon-
naissance have largely reduced the problems that can arise from the difficulties of
terrain and logistics. Supply lines remain particularly vulnerable to ambushes and
a preferred target for insurgents. But the proportion of this problem has changed.
In today’s Iraq, whole armies are not at risk of starving to death because they could
be cutoff from supplies, as happened to the Napoleonic armies in Spain. In today’s
Afghanistan, large forces do not face the threat of attrition because of being cutoff
from communications and reinforcements over periods of weeks, as happened to the
British in their Afghan wars of the nineteenth century. But at the same time, the tech-
nical means now available to insurgents are increasingly effective against forces
superior in quality and quantity even independently of the specific advantages of the
terrain. Although precisely the weaknesses that made regular forces vulnerable to
guerrilla strategies in the past have been largely reduced, asymmetric warfare has
become a global threat freed from the geographical restrictions of the past.
The Ambivalence of MP Today
For centuries, the evolution of firepower had strengthened the might of the strong
over the weak. But now the growth of destructive forces made available by the
evolution of firepower has led to the increasingly disproportionate effectiveness
weak actors can display against strong ones. Today, strength results in vulnerability
as much as in superior firepower. The consequence is not only that conflict scenarios
are generally becoming more asymmetric between strong and weak actors but also
that there is an increasing ambivalence of MP between the asymmetric advantages of
the strong in conventional warfare and the asymmetric advantages of the weak in
unconventional warfare.
In conventional warfare, a general symmetry exists in particular between com-
paratively strong actors with respect to their mutual vulnerability. For the stronger
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an actor is, themore dependent he is on political, economic, andmilitary infrastructures
which can be attacked, but not defended, by asymmetric means. In order to be able to
fight off an enemy’s military force or to strike back against him, states generally
continue to compete for similar military capabilities. Consequently, the armaments
of all major states remain adjusted to wars between regular forces. But the evolution
of military technology has also brought about asymmetries in capabilities between
states. The transformation toward network-centric-warfare which especially in the
1990s was hailed as a revolution in military affairs26 has provided the United States
in particularwith a vast superiority over all other regular forces in conventionalwarfare.
However, as much as these developments created asymmetric advantages for
strong actors, they forced weaker actors increasingly to resort to asymmetric means
themselves. For this reason Arthur Cebrowski, who has gone down in history as the
preeminent proponent of network-centric warfare, once described the rise of
asymmetric warfare as ‘‘largely our own creation.’’27 But it was also the evolution
of technology that enabled the weak to resort to asymmetric means. For it increasingly
produces comparatively cheap and less sophisticated weapons systems which provide
capabilities to strike back even against the most sophisticated forces.28 Consequently,
the asymmetric advantages of the strong even among states do not necessarily translate
into domination over an opponent any longer.
What ismore, efficiency in conventional warfare increasinglymeans inefficiency in
unconventional warfare. Somemodern technologies that increase themeans of surveil-
lance while offering an immediate strike capability such as unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) can increase the pursuit pressure on insurgents. But in general since the effi-
ciency of today’s highly sophisticated weapons systemsmainly stems from a combina-
tion of intelligence, processing of information, and the precision of weapons, they
largely lose their advantages against an enemy that can avoid identification by fighting
in an asymmetric way. In addition, the more advanced the weapons systems are, the
higher the costs and maintenance efforts have become and their numbers as well as the
numbers of combat troops in general have been sharply reduced in nearly all armies.
Yet, as the earlier comparison between military control in colonial empires in the nine-
teenth and insurgencies in early twenty-first century has demonstrated, far more troops
would actually be required to establish military control today.
In consequence the quality of MP is changing with respect to at least four major
aspects. Throughout history, MP has embraced the capability to protect against
attacks or to conquer territories. Today, the evolution of firepower has resulted in
weapons that can destroy their targets more effectively, over longer distances, and
with more accuracy than ever before. But the better weapons can hit, the less
protection they offer. So MP, first, increasingly cannot provide for defense any more
but at most can serve as a deterrent. MP between strong actors becomes increasingly
limited to a capability to punish each other, instead of exercising and expanding
power over one another. If in a war among states an actor can destroy most of an
enemy’s infrastructure and military, this does not simply lead to conquest any more
as even comparatively minor resistance can impede control of an occupied territory.
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It follows that, second, MP can serve increasingly less as a direct instrument of
rule.29
Therefore, the evolution of MP as well as the growing vulnerability of the
strong increasingly benefits, third, mostly nonstate actors in conflicts with states.
The modern state which emerged as an effective monopolizer of force is no longer
its most effective bearer. Consequently, also within the state the monopoly on the
use of force, though it may still find observance as a normative claim, is increas-
ingly difficult to actually enforce against violent resistance. Furthermore, the ratio-
nale for using MP with its respective effectiveness has changed differently for
different kinds of actors. In particular, the relation between costs and benefits of
warfare has moved in opposite directions for weak and strong actors. For strong
actors, not only in wars against their equals, the costs are outweighing potential
gains more and more. Also in wars against weaker actors, the amount of resources
they need to employ in order to compensate for the increasing effectiveness of
asymmetric strategies is growing. While wars have become more expensive for the
strong, they have become cheaper for the weak. Since the proportional amount of
manpower and resources weaker actors need to resist stronger ones is decreasing,
the economic threshold enabling them to wage war is, fourth, lowering. So it has
become even easier for weaker actors to obtain the necessary resources by means
of violence. Hence, the economy of the ‘‘new wars’’ largely relies on looting and
plundering, benefiting only the violent few whose gains stand in stark contrast to
the damage done to the society as a whole30—thus demonstrating even in this
regard the asymmetries to which the transformation of MP has led.
Re´sume´
In conclusion, a rough formula for the influence of technology on the evolution of
MP can be drawn up. In general terms, proportional advantages for strong or weak
actors as well as for different strategies can be linked to the capabilities for
protection or attack which existing technologies can offer by lowering or raising
the impact and reach of an individual’s fighting potential. As far as the capability
to protect outweighs the capability to attack it favors weak actors following defen-
sive strategies. If there is a more balanced relation MP becomes more relative,
favoring the stronger. But if the impact of attack outweighs the capability to pro-
tect, it favors weak actors that follow asymmetric strategies based on aggressive
tactics.
In reality, such differences in the quality of MP are gradual. Strength will
always be an advantage as opposed to weakness, but compared with other
parameters strength and weakness can be much more or less decisive. Besides
the technological foundation of MP only describes a potential that defines the
theoretical possibilities for what MP can be. What it actually is, results from the
relation between technological capabilities and the social and normative
restrictions of an actor.
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Social Structures and Norms as Determinants of MP
From the beginning of early modern times until the World Wars, the impact of social
structures and norms on the ability to generate MP can appear to be negligible for
two reasons. First, as the technological foundation of MP made it more relative the
potential extend of this impact decreased gradually. During this time, second,
Western powers rose to global dominance which, due to an intense and long-term
competition among themselves, had become closely adapted to each other with
respect to the social foundation of MP. Today, however, the increasing asymmetries
in the technical foundations of MP go hand in hand with increasing asymmetries in
its social foundations. To substantiate this point, I will first refer to the question of
whether differences in the casualty awareness in recent asymmetric wars can be
explained better by a shift of norms in particular in Western societies or by relating
them to the interests at stake (subsection Towards a Postheroic Society?). In a second
step, I want to demonstrate that in a long-term historical perspective the readiness to
sacrifice and military participation in societies has differed largely (subsection
Casualty Awareness and Military Participation in Historical Perspective). Third, I
will point out that these differences result from social factors—influencing the readi-
ness to sacrifice, the readiness to use force, and the resulting styles of warfare—
which serve as variable determinants of MP (subsection Interests, Society, and
Norms).
Towards a Post-Heroic Society?
The evolution of the technological foundations of MP is a condition without which
weak actors in contemporary conflicts such as in Iraq and Afghanistan could not be
effective. But this reason alone cannot explain it either. For the United States still
commands such an overwhelming superiority of resources that for the insurgents any
chance of success depends on a comparative lack of determination on the other side.
This, however, was already true for most low-intensity conflicts fought and lost by a
Western power since 1945. In these wars, the superiority of the stronger actors was
effectively outweighed by an even greater disparity of commitment between the
opponents. How can this difference be explained? Opinions on this have generally
separated into two schools of thought.
The first school argues that a change in social structures and values has raised
thresholds for casualties in modern societies. One explanation for the difficulties
of Western powers in prevailing in asymmetric conflicts today attributes them to the
constraints imposed on the ability to use force in modern democracies.31However,
although liberal democracy and a reluctance to resort to force may have mutually
supported each other’s evolution, their relationship appears to be rather one of
coincidence than of causality; for this reluctance would have only evolved over time.
In the World War I, democratic France was by no means less prepared to accept
casualties than autocratic Russia.
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Another explanation focuses on the influence of demographic change. Connections
have been drawn between the extent of a ‘‘youth bulge’’ and the readiness in societies
to use force and to sacrifice.32 According to Edward Luttwak, declining birth rates and
rising life expectancy have produced an increased sensitivity to casualties. That this
development has not been confined to democracies is indicated by the importance
given to the aim of minimizing losses by the Soviet strategy in Afghanistan.33 Luttwak
and Herfried Mu¨nkler34 assert a shift in values toward a ‘‘post-heroic’’ mentality,
meaning that the willingness to sacrifice—or ‘‘heroism’’—largely lost its earlier
esteem in society. For Michael Howard, loyalty toward country and nation has
declined so much in postindustrial and increasingly transnationally interconnected
societies that it no longer generates the same readiness for sacrifice as in the nineteenth
or early twentieth centuries.35 In any case, the consequences of a post-heroic aversion
to war would be that support for war declines with the rise of casualties as formulated
first by John Mueller with respect to the Vietnam war.36 That comparable drops in
support for the Iraq war occurred after much smaller losses demonstrates in his view
that the casualty aversion has actually increased over time.37
The second school holds that a willingness to use force and to sacrifice is related
to interest—or the perception of interests within a society. Andrew Mack argued
after the American withdrawal from Vietnam that in such cases a significant
difference in the intensity of the interests of the actors involved is the decisive factor
leading to a much more limited willingness of the stronger actor to make sacrifices.38
So a disproportion of resources would be compensated by an even greater dispropor-
tion of interests. The relevance of relative capabilities for the constitution of MP
would not however be called into question. Similar approaches to explain casualty
aversion have been based on a rational expectation theory according to which the
public weights casualties against the interests at stake.39 As such a consideration
depends on attitudes about the rightness or wrongness of the war as well as the
likelihood of success,40 it depends also on how they are presented by political
leaders and the media as well as on the level of political information of the addres-
sees.41 It also appears that Western governments have tended to overestimate the
public’s casualty aversion.42
The proponents of a growing casualty aversion can argue citing two historical
facts: first, a growing aversion to war can be followed particularly in the developed
world throughout the entire twentieth century, with the two World Wars providing
particular impetus to this trend.43 Second, at least since the Vietnam War there has
not been a military engagement of any Western power, which has resulted in relative
casualty rates similar to those suffered by them in European and Colonial wars
before. But this also means that both schools lack empirical evidence in the form
of a major test case. Thus, authors who see interests as a decisive factor have to rely
on opinion polls, which suggest that willingness to accept casualties seems to grow
as vital interests appear to be at stake.
But opinion polls are questionable evidence, too. First, interest perceptions can be
subjective and it is possible that casualty awareness does not only follow them but
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that people reconsider interests with raising casualty rates. In fact studies on recent
public opinion in the United States suggest that support for the use of force depends
on whether the objectives themselves are perceived as aiming rather to prevent
losses than to seek gains.44 Second, linking casualty awareness to vital interests in
particular is suggestive and can thus be misleading. It is suggestive because it
implies the tautological conclusion that people are willing to sacrifice for what they
see as worth sacrificing for. And it is misleading because the notion of vital interests
suggests that there is some absolute standard making people willing to sacrifice for it
to the end. But in modern Western history at least, for states and nations even major
wars were vital only in exceptional cases. Most of them were about the redistribution
of power, of some territories or resources—until the next contest. This is not to say
that societies did not fight for what they perceived as vital interests. But in most
cases, perceived vital interests are just as relative as any other interest.
The third problem concerns the application of rational expectation theory. It
suggests that there is a rationale linking interest or lack of interest to casualty
aversion. But this raises the question of how to specify objectively what interests
societies are willing to use force and to sacrifice for. Even if opinion polls show a
specific relation between interests and casualty thresholds in a given society, this
does not prove that the relation would be the same in another society or at another
time. But because data on relevant opinion polls hardly cover more than a few
contemporary decades, they do not allow identification of a more general standard
linking the intensity of interests to a corresponding willingness to make sacrifices.
Quantitative research on the relation between interest perception and casualty
thresholds in public opinion has demonstrated that support for military engagements
does not simply depend on casualty numbers but also on interest perceptions. But
this finding does not prove that there is no overall tendency toward a growing
casualty aversion. To assess to what extent casualty aversion shapes the military
capability of societies, the analytical scope has to include much broader historical
comparisons. The narrower the time frame of an analysis, the more it appears
plausible to link casualty thresholds to interest. But as the following examples shall
demonstrate, the broader the historical perspective gets, the more plausible it
becomes that social factors determine a society’s willingness to sacrifice and the
military participation related to it.
Casualty Awareness and Military Participation in Historical Perspective
To be sure, there are examples—most notably the World Wars—in which only
demographic and economic potentials seemed to limit a society’s military capabil-
ities. But precisely because they were the most extensive wars in modern history
they could well be just an exceptional case, a ‘‘monstrous cultural aberration.’’45
A lack of empirical evidence forbids any definitive assessment of whether a similar
readiness to sacrifice would be reproducible today. But the historical evidence
indicates that such an assumption cannot be taken for granted. Because of a lack
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of data matching modern opinion polls, long-term comparisons have to rely on much
less specific findings of military history. These findings, however, can suggest that
this readiness was only the result of a very peculiar social evolution.
It was a historical peculiarity of the Western dominated power system in modern
times that it remained over a long period shaped by a balance and consequently by an
intense competition for power. In contrast to the empires of Rome and Asia, no
Western state could successfully ignore or subdue the market forces that came to
shape the foundations of MP. Thus, they were exposed to a permanent pressure for
innovation and adaption.46 As a consequence, successful competitors not only
needed to increasingly become equally capable of mobilizing their demographic and
economic potentials for MP, they also needed to become closely adapted to each
other with respect to the social foundations of MP. The result was an increasing
militarization of Western societies until the World Wars. But this required both
institutional and social preconditions.
The institutional one was the emergence of the modern state with its bureaucratic
institutions, including a professional army establishment. Before its emergence, the
capability to mobilize resources for war depended much more on its social order; for
social orders had been primarily constituted through the possession of MP, which
therefore was limited by how inclusively or exclusively it was organized. By restrict-
ing the possession of force as an instrument of rule social orders could allow for a
higher or lower military participation ratio.47 One consequence of the emergence of
the modern state was that the possession of force was increasingly transferred from
social classes to bureaucratic institutions capable of managing an expansion of
military participation until the state could virtually organize whole societies for war.
Such a mobilization for war, however, was also dependent on social precondi-
tions: primarily, a society’s social cohesion and its members’ willingness to serve.
The common goals social groups are willing to fight and to sacrifice for, are not
physically given, but socially constructed and dependent on the strength of a com-
mon identity. The social cohesion necessary for the growth of military participation
in Western societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was provided by the
rise in national identities and loyalties. In this sense, social cohesion was particularly
crucial for the mass mobilization of the World War as it required a high degree of
voluntariness. No compulsory system could ever have mobilized millions of young
Europeans if most of them had not considered military service to be their duty. The
casualty rates in particular of the World War I are less a reflection of the interests
involved but of the readiness to accept sacrifices in the societies affected.
At a time when the citizen forces of ancient Rome had been replaced by profes-
sional soldiers, the apostle Paul took it for granted that none of his contemporaries
would serve in the army at his own expense.48 But, as Keegan noted,49 this was
precisely what millions of young Europeans did in the World Wars when they
relinquished income and safety to serve at the front. This willingness to serve, how-
ever, rested on a social compulsion, too: the power of social values that effectively
obliged men to fight for their country in the event of war or else lose the respect of
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their families, friends, and wives. Do the same nations share the same values today so
that families and friends would also urge men to fight rather than to stay at home?
The lack of a test case forbids any definitive answers to how Western societies
would respond today to a major war or perceived vital interests as in the case of the
World Wars. But it is possible to compare how the willingness to use force and to
sacrifice evolved in minor wars, when nonvital interests are at stake. In this respect,
it is revealing to compare the Boer war 1899–1902 with the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq a century later. This comparison seems justified because the British hardly had a
greater interest in annexing the Boer republics than the United States has in military
success in Iraq or Afghanistan. With respect to security, the Boer republics obviously
posed less of a threat than what might materialize today from terrorism or even
weapons of mass destruction in the latter cases. Moreover, the Boers were less
perceived by the British as an enemy than Saddam Hussein, Al Qaida, or the Taliban
today by the United States, as indicated by the fact that many of their leaders soon
joined the British colonial administration and later the government of the Union of
South Africa.
Nevertheless, the British put up with casualty rates that far exceeded those of the
United States in Iraq or Afghanistan. Whereas in Iraq and Afghanistan US annual
death rates have been well below 1 percent, during the Boer war around 2.5 percent
of the British troops perished due to disease and around 1.4 percent were killed50 in
action annually. Comparing the respective populations of both countries, the overall
British casualty rate was around twenty times higher, her losses equivalent to a six-
digit number of deaths for the United States today. Moreover, the Boer war saw
volunteers sign up from all over the empire, often even paying their own expenses
themselves.51 Where is the run to the recruiting offices when it comes to the contem-
porary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? The comparison between the Boer war and
today’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provides only an indication of how much the
willingness to use force and to sacrifice to pursue their interests can differ signifi-
cantly over time or between different societies. But in conclusion, the willingness
to use force and sacrifice does not appear to be simply a function of interests. On
the contrary, it is rather this willingness in a society that decides what kind of
interests this society, its political organization, or its leaders can pursue.
Interests, Society, and Norms
There is at least one fundamental problem preventing the willingness to sacrifice
from being sufficiently explained by linking it to interests—or, to be more precise,
to objective interests aimed at the possession of material potentials in terms of eco-
nomic resources or political power, as the term will be understood in the following.
To sacrifice for the pursuit of interests can make sense for collective actors such as
states; for in war they face either an existential threat or only relative losses. But for
the individual soldier the risk is existential in any case, whereas even an existential
threat to their collective actors need not constitute an existential threat to themselves.
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Relative risks can be weighed against interests, but existential risks cannot,
especially if there is no existential threat; for one needs to live to have any interest.52
In most wars, particularly in the Western world, the security and well-being of a
soldier, his family, and possessions were not endangered by one’s side victory or
defeat but by his own participation in the war.
Although the willingness to fight can be used to pursue interests, it must precede
them. For this reason, Martin van Creveld argues that this willingness has to be
backed by a culture of war which is ultimately rooted deep in human nature.53
Human nature, however, cannot offer a comprehensive explanation but can only
constitute a general predisposition; for as van Creveld himself asserts, the extent
to which the culture of war actually occurs as well as the aims it serves can vary
significantly between both individuals and societies.54 For this reason John Keegan
concluded, too, that why and how men fight is predominantly determined by cultural
causes rather than political interests but focused in this respect on the impact of
social structures, norms, and ideas.55 The criticism this argument has found—mainly
that the concept of culture is vague and that hardly a clear dividing line between
interest-based political and cultural reasons can be drawn56—underlines rather than
contradicts a relevant conclusion: the impact of the social environment on MP is by
necessity vague, because there is no common denominator for the how and why of
warfare in military history. This is also the point I want to plausibilize: social factors
shape the actual disposition to warfare and thus the MP of actors individually with
respect to at least three factors. The first is the readiness to sacrifice. The second is
the readiness to use force. The third are social norms and structures that determine an
actor’s specific style of warfare.
First, the readiness to sacrifice can differ significantly between societies because
it depends on social developments; for anthropologically, the desire to avoid the vital
risk of a direct fight rather than the readiness to take it seems to be the far more
common condition of human behavior. Hence, in primitive warfare, battles are usu-
ally highly ritualized, limiting the number of casualties. What made it a very bloody
affair was ambushes aimed at the killing of enemies when they were defenseless.57
To enter into a direct fight between warriors requires overcoming considerable
reluctance. As a methodical way of war, the decisive battle fought out in direct
combat was a later invention that can be attributed to the Greek hoplites and has even
been interpreted—controversially—as a feature of a specific Western way of war.58
Anyway, these examples indicate that the extent to which people are prepared to take
risks in war depends primarily on socialization, not interest.
Second, the readiness to use force in a society appears to be likewise influenced
by the evolution of civilization. A reluctance to kill, for instance, can hardly be
explained anthropologically; for it hardly exists in primitive warfare where mass
killings in the form of massacres are a usual occurrence leading to much heavier
casualty rates than in any modern war.59 In modern societies, by contrast, where
violence and warfare are a much more exceptional experience to mould socializa-
tion, armies need to rely on an intense physical and psychological conditioning to
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secure their soldiers’ willingness to fight and kill.60 Studies indicate that the
readiness to use force cannot only be very unevenly shared between different soci-
eties and times, but also within societies, with most of it applied by ‘‘the violent
few.’’61 In most contemporary conflicts, most violence stems only from small mino-
rities of people.62 The same goes for the genocides of the twentieth century in which
the atrocities committed by comparatively few perpetrators contrast sharply with the
passiveness of vast majorities.63 These findings are an additional reason to conclude
that the decision to use force does not evolve just as a rational means to an end.64
As with the readiness to sacrifice, the readiness to use force is a constraint of MP.
During and after the Iraqi insurgency of 1920, British forces systematically used
punitive military action against the civilian population to forestall further
resistance.65 Whether such methods would be successful today may be questionable.
But it can well be argued that normative restrictions have significantly impaired the
efficiency of counterinsurgency in Iraq after 2003.66 However, using force in a
generally more ruthless way is simply no longer an option that would conform to the
values of Western societies and militaries.67
Third, the extent to which a society is willing to sacrifice as well as the extent and
the ways in which it is ready to use force translate into and are constrained by social
values. Whereas the individual use of force normally violates social norms, its
collective application generally needs to be carried out in accordance with them; for
the forms of violence that war permits against enemies are incompatible with the
domestic life in whatever kind of social unit that is waging it. As an exemption from
what is allowed in peacetime, warfare requires a legitimization provided by rules
that distinguish the deeds of warriors from those of criminals. Fundamental
disregard for these principles threatens the legitimacy and cohesion of the social
order. This applies not only to the values of a society as a whole but also to the
conduct of military forces. As social organizations their coherence depends, inter
alia, on structures and doctrines based on traditions, mentalities, and values.68
Such structures and norms translate into specific styles ofwarfare limiting the adapt-
ability and efficiencyofmilitaries in conflictswith different forces. One recent example
is the difficulties doctrine and the organizational structure of the US forces posted in
Vietnam to adapt to effective counterinsurgency strategy, while the British were com-
paratively more flexible in Malaya.69 Long periods of competition can lead to a close
adaption between prevailing actors, making differences in the style of warfare almost
vanish—as itwas the case for centuries inEuropeanmilitaryhistory.However, this does
not mean that actors in general would be able to adapt and prevail in low-intensity con-
flicts or against the emergence of different kinds of challengers in the short run; they are
probably the less capable of doing so the more complex they are socially. But if actors
are not adapted by a similar coevolution, differences in the style of warfare can bemore
decisive than the distribution of resources and was thus often a selective criterion that
determined the survival or demise of actors. It is not simply military efficiency that
determines how men fight but, again, rather the other way around that how they fight
can limit their chances of military success and thus also their MP.
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If the readiness to use force and to sacrifice as well as the resulting style of
warfare can differ largely among actors, they can be understood as a major
contributing factor in the difficulties state actors in general and Western powers
in particular have faced in many asymmetric wars in recent times. A declining readi-
ness to make sacrifices and to use force effectively reduces an actor’s MP toward an
opponent with a greater threshold for casualties. In such cases, the mutual assess-
ment of each other’s MP between actors can also change; for enemies will reckon
less with an actor’s resources than with his limits of tolerance. This was evidently
the case with Osama bin Laden, for whom fighting the United States only made
sense because he saw them as a paper tiger.70 Western powers, on the contrary, need
to compensate for lower tolerance levels with an asymmetric superiority. The
technological development of their militaries largely aims at minimizing casualties,
which is not simply identical with efficiency in warfare, given alone the dispropor-
tionate expenditure it can require. The implications of this inequality in the readiness
to use force and to make sacrifices for MP are linked to its technological
foundations. The more relative it is in this respect, the more the potentially greater
aggressiveness of a weaker actor or a minority can be checked by the greater
resources of stronger actors, the majority, or a central authority. But the less relative
it is, the easier it becomes for the few or the weak to take on the many or the strong.
Re´sume´
War was, as Clausewitz wrote, always as much a moral as a physical struggle. But
today as from a Western point of view the kinds of actors posing a potential threat,
their means and strategies as well as their respective willingness to resort to violence
and to make sacrifices in armed conflicts are increasingly diversifying, the moral
factor is becoming even more decisive. Since a growing casualty aversion
effectively reduces an actor’s MP toward an opponent with a greater threshold for
casualties, it probably reduces the effectiveness of Western military deployments
no less than the evolution of technology does.
What, to sum up, is the impact of social factors on MP? An actor’s ability to
mobilize his resources for war is limited by his readiness to resort to force and to
make sacrifices. But since this is subject to long-term social and cultural transforma-
tions, it can be quite unevenly distributed both between and within societies. The
effect of such differences is increased or decreased by the technical aspects of
MP. The more relative the technical capabilities, the less an actor’s greater aggres-
siveness can alter the balance of power. Today, however, it is rather the other way
around, and the disproportionate effectiveness offered to weaker actors by the
evolution of technology encounters a growing disproportionality of readiness among
actors to use force and to make sacrifices. Both factors together accelerate the
asymmetry of conflicts by favoring not only the weaker but in particular the more
aggressive.
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Conclusions
In the present probably the most fundamental transformation of MP is taking place
since the invention of effective firearms more than half a millennium ago. While the
‘‘gunpowder revolution’’ made MP increasingly relative and thus depended on
demographic and economic resources, its current transformation reverses this trend.
The technological evolution is providing weaker actors with the chance of exerting
an increasingly overproportional impact of force. Social developments have resulted
in a growing disparity in the readiness to use force and to make sacrifices as well as
the related style of warfare among actors. The consequence is an increasing
asymmetry favoring weaker but more aggressive actors between and within
societies. As a result, while Western powers expanded easily such as in nineteenth
century Sudan they today face significantly greater obstacles overcoming even
comparatively small insurgencies like in twenty-first century Iraq.
The function of MP changes differently for different actors. Between states the
ability to wage wars remains a function of MP but decreasingly as a direct instru-
ment of rule. Peer competitors among states can actually carry more destruction
faster to each other than ever before, but they can only decreasingly enforce their
will on an opponent through the occupation and control of territories. Under such
circumstances, the relation of costs and benefits has generally become more unfa-
vorable to war between them. Furthermore, states are no longer either the sole or the
most efficient bearers of MP, because the command over larger resources no longer
translates into military superiority so easily.
Today, the evolution of MP leads not to a concentration but to a dispersion of
power. This also means that the social and political order can be threatened by ever
smaller groups of violent actors. It is a consequence that interstate wars are
increasingly replaced by intrastate conflicts or asymmetric wars against nonstate
actors. Thus, the evolution of MP weakens the monopoly on the use of force
characteristic for the modern state. However, it would be too far-fetched to interpret
the stability of societies as a mere function of MP. Like MP, the domestic as well as
the international security of states depends on the respective social fabric and in
particular on the readiness to use force and to make sacrifices within and between
societies. Thus, the evolution of MP need not necessarily lead to the failure of the
modern state. What it allows us to conclude is that it increases the vulnerability
of the modern state to violent opposition and failure.
As long as MP was generally relative, a theory of MP could largely neglect an
actor’s individual function; for due to intense competition the prevailing actors had
become closely adapted to each other with respect to not only their political, social
and military organization, and economic systems but also their strategic culture and
accordingly the model of rationality they followed. Strength in terms of resources and
progress mattered, and actors who could not cope with that were over time either mar-
ginalized or eliminated. For the powers that prevailed under these circumstances, an
efficient pursuit of power and the resources necessary to generate it practically had
350 Armed Forces & Society 40(2)
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on August 20, 2015afs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
to become an end in itself. This effect shaped the rational choice models—aiming at
making gains or preventing losses in terms of material interests—and the related
image of the rational actor in international relations theory.
The applicability of this model of rationality, however, does not depend on ration-
ality as a general standard of behavior. For even disregarding its potential boundaries,
rationality is about means, not aims; aims finally rely always on axiomatic premises.
Which of them may be relevant cannot ultimately be predetermined by theory but
depends on the impact they can generate. If MP becomes less relative, possible
impacts become disconnected from competitiveness in terms of quantity and quality
of capabilities. Consequently, more and more different actors and models of rational-
ity can gain relevance. As a result, the scope with which ideological and normative
differences as well as simple material profit can have an impact on the emergence and
conduct of conflicts is increasing. It is the impact that is new, not the motives.
This analysis demonstrates the selective function of MP. Not only the quantity but
also the qualities of MP determine the kind of actors and conflict scenarios that can
pose a threat to international as well as domestic security. The more relative it is, the
more restrictive this selection becomes and the more variables can be neglected in
any formula of MP itself. Such a reality has been largely captured by Waltz
Neorealism as the intentionally most parsimonious theory of international politics.
If MP, however, becomes less relative and thus less selective, it is no longer possible
to cover its function with a similarly unified theory.
With the quality of MP the challenges for theory also change. The more relative it
is, the more its analysis can remain on the level of comparable capabilities
measuring their proportional distribution. But if MP becomes less relative, fewer
factors can be neglected and the formula of MP is more complex. In order to cover
these factors a theory has to include two deeper levels of analysis. In the first level,
the qualities of capabilities have to be examined, not their proportional distribution,
but the proportionality or disproportionality of their potential impact in war in
comparison with the relative strength of actors. The potential impact determines the
effectiveness of tactical options and strategies.
Whereas the potential impact only opens up such options abstractly, their practical
usability is restricted by social factors. Therefore, the influence of social structures and
norms on MP has to be examined in the second level; for they define an actor’s
individual thresholds with respect to his ability to mobilize his resources in war, the
sacrifices he can bear and the ways in which he can actually use force. As these thresh-
olds can differ individually, the formula for MP can look different for different actors.
This can imply that it can only be assessed specifically in comparison between
opponents.Moreover, all these factors are open to evolutionary change.Any theory that
tries to cover the whole of the history of warfare must either fail or be limited to such
general observations that it is practically useless. But the more specific a theory is, the
more limited can be the time to which it is applicable. If theory needs to comprehend
evolutionary changes, it has to take an evolutionary approach itself, broadening or
narrowing its focus to include or exclude different levels and factors of MP.
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